Channel myopia is the newest strain. Levitt's subjects defined themselves by product. Many modern incumbents define themselves by distribution channel: the network, the newspaper, the branch, the dealership. It's more dangerous because channel loyalty is even weaker than product loyalty. Viewers didn't owe television anything, and the need ('entertain my evening', 'inform my morning') crossed to new pipes the moment they were more convenient. Any definition containing a channel noun has an expiry date attached.
Metrics myopia is how the disease hides in well-run companies. Dashboards are built to optimise the current answer (TRPs, circulation, same-store sales, average revenue per user), and averages are structurally blind to migration: a stable mean can hide a collapsing young cohort offset by ageing loyalists. The corrective is cohort resolution: split every health metric by age and tenure, and the future stops hiding inside the average.
Christensen's disruption model explains why smart incumbents stay myopic on purpose. Listening to your best customers and improving your flagship's margin are correct decisions by every quarterly test, even as the 'toy' substitute improves faster than the need's requirements rise. The trap isn't stupidity. It's rationality with a short horizon. That's why myopia audits must be institutional (a standing process with authority) rather than depending on a visionary noticing.
Stakeholder myopia, named by Smith, Drumwright and Gentile, is the strain that punishes even the customer-obsessed. A company can read its buyers perfectly while regulators, talent, platforms, and society redefine the category around it: sugar gets relabelled, gig-work rules rewrite unit economics, a platform's algorithm change deletes a distribution strategy overnight. The customer is necessary and no longer sufficient. The modern definition question includes who else can veto your business.